The Demographic Impact Of The Great Migration

Monday, September 27, 2021 11:53:21 AM

The Demographic Impact Of The Great Migration

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Why Do People Migrate?! (Push \u0026 Pull Factors: AP Human Geo)

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Studies Art Literature. Martin Luther King Jr. African-American businesses Middle class Upper class Billionaires. Institutions Black church. Black theology Womanist theology. LGBT community. Dialects and languages. Violence in the Atlanta race riot. Historical background. Bush Stephen Williams Frazier B. Massacres and riots. Related topics. Black genocide Civil rights movement — Civil rights movement — Mass racial violence in the United States. Main article: New Great Migration. Smithsonian American Art Museum. Retrieved October 3, America's Great Migrations Projects.

University of Washington. Retrieved March 25, Smithsonian Magazine. Retrieved July 31, Balkin, Richard ed. Colonial America to New York: Facts on File. ISBN United States Census Bureau. Population Division Working Papers. Archived from the original PDF on March 27, Archived from the original PDF on February 7, Retrieved June 24, New York: Alfred A. May The Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on June 17, Retrieved March 19, The New York Times. Retrieved July 9, Chicago Tribune. Retrieved September 22, Archived from the original on June 29, Retrieved July 26, Statistics provided by the Archives at Tuskegee Institute. African Americans: A Concise History 4th ed. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. Retrieved February 2, Black protest and the great migration : a brief history with documents.

OCLC August 15, Spring Journal of American Ethnic History. Chicago: U of Chicago P, May 20, Claire; Cayton, Horace R. Joe W. Trotter Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. Way up north in Louisville : African American migration in the urban South, Black Chick On Tour. Retrieved June 1, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. ISSN Publishers Weekly. September Retrieved August 16, Retrieved April 2, Retrieved June 15, Szatmary , Rockin' in Time , 8th ed. Archived December 24, , at the Wayback Machine U. Bureau of the Census — Population Division. Census Bureau, February Encyclopedia Britannica.

Retrieved February 19, Accessed September 23, The Review of Black Political Economy. The Journal of Human Resources. JSTOR Washington, D. Census Bureau , U. Government Printing Office. Sociological Perspectives. Trotter, and Eric Ledell Smith, eds. Harrison, Alferdteen. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. The Renaissance Collaborative. White rage : the unspoken truth of our racial divide. New York, NY. The Butler: A Witness to History. Hartford Stage. Archived from the original PDF on October 25, Retrieved September 11, Brookings Institution Press. USA Today.

African Americans. Gabriel Prosser Joseph Rainey A. Washington Ida B. Wells Oprah Winfrey Andrew Young. Civic and economic groups. Negro league baseball Baseball color line Black players in professional American football Black quarterbacks list History of African Americans in the Canadian Football League Black players in ice hockey list. Athletic associations and conferences. Neighborhoods list U. African immigration to the United States. Eritrean Ethiopian Somali Bantu in Maine. Angolan Malawian South African Zimbabwean.

Cameroonian Congolese Equatoguinean Gabonese. Category United States portal. Demographics of the United States. Demographic history. The New York Times. Retrieved July 9, Charleston Gazette-Mail. Frey May Brookings Institution. Retrieved July 10, African Americans. Gabriel Prosser Joseph Rainey A. Washington Ida B. Wells Oprah Winfrey Andrew Young. Civic and economic groups. Negro league baseball Baseball color line Black players in professional American football Black quarterbacks list History of African Americans in the Canadian Football League Black players in ice hockey list.

Athletic associations and conferences. Neighborhoods list U. I found an astonishing need for food and witnessed the ways competition and poverty among the displaced broke down cultural and moral boundaries. But the picture on the ground is scattered. To better understand the forces and scale of climate migration over a broader area, The New York Times Magazine and ProPublica joined with the Pulitzer Center in an effort to model, for the first time, how people will move across borders. We focused on changes in Central America and used climate and economic-development data to examine a range of scenarios. Our model projects that migration will rise every year regardless of climate, but that the amount of migration increases substantially as the climate changes.

In the most extreme climate scenarios, more than 30 million migrants would head toward the U. Migrants move for many reasons, of course. The model helps us see which migrants are driven primarily by climate, finding that they would make up as much as 5 percent of the total. If governments take modest action to reduce climate emissions, about , climate migrants might move from Central America and Mexico to the United States between now and If emissions continue unabated, leading to more extreme warming, that number jumps to more than a million people.

None of these figures include undocumented immigrants, whose numbers could be twice as high. The model shows that the political responses to both climate change and migration can lead to drastically different futures. As the climate changes, drought and food insecurity drive rural residents in Mexico and Central America out of the countryside. Millions seek relief, first in big cities, spurring a rapid and increasingly overwhelming urbanization. Then they move farther north, pushing the largest number of migrants toward the United States.

The projected number of migrants arriving from Central America and Mexico rises to 1. We modeled another scenario in which the United States hardens its borders. People are turned back, and economic growth in Central America slows, as does urbanization. That version of the world leaves tens of millions of people more desperate and with fewer options. Misery reigns, and large populations become trapped.

As with much modeling work, the point here is not to provide concrete numerical predictions so much as it is to provide glimpses into possible futures. Human movement is notoriously hard to model, and as many climate researchers have noted, it is important not to add a false precision to the political battles that inevitably surround any discussion of migration. But our model offers something far more potentially valuable to policymakers: a detailed look at the staggering human suffering that will be inflicted if countries shut their doors. In recent months, the coronavirus pandemic has offered a test run on whether humanity has the capacity to avert a predictable — and predicted — catastrophe.

Some countries have fared better. But the United States has failed. The climate crisis will test the developed world again, on a larger scale, with higher stakes. The only way to mitigate the most destabilizing aspects of mass migration is to prepare for it, and preparation demands a sharper imagining of where people are likely to go, and when. In November , Alan B. Krueger, a labor economist known for his statistical work on inequality, walked into the Princeton University offices of Michael Oppenheimer, a leading climate geoscientist, and asked him whether anyone had ever tried to quantify how and where climate change would cause people to move.

Earlier that year, Oppenheimer helped write the U. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report that, for the first time, explored in depth how climate disruption might uproot large segments of the global population. But as groundbreaking as the report was — the U. Demographers, agronomists and economists were all doing their work on climate change in isolation, but understanding the question of migration would have to include all of them. They began to examine the statistical relationships — say, between census data and crop yields and historical weather patterns — in Mexico to try to understand how farmers there respond to drought. Their study, published in in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, found that Mexican migration to the United States pulsed upward during periods of drought and projected that by , climate change there could drive 6.

The modeling was a start. But it was hyperlocal instead of global, and it left open huge questions: how cultural differences might change outcomes, for example, or how population shifts might occur across larger regions. That argument eventually found some traction with migration researchers, many of whom remain reluctant to model precise migration figures. But to Oppenheimer and Krueger, the risks of putting a specific shape to this well established but amorphous threat seemed worth taking. Others ignored that advice, producing some of the earliest projections about the dire impact of climate change, and with them some of the earliest opportunities to try to steer away from that fate. Trying to project the consequences of climate-driven migration, to Oppenheimer, called for similarly provocative efforts.

Dozens more studies have applied econometric modeling to climate-related problems, seizing on troves of data to better understand how environmental change and conflict each lead to migration and clarify how the cycle works. Climate is rarely the main cause of migration, the studies have generally found, but it is almost always an exacerbating one. Drought helped push many Syrians into cities before the war, worsening tensions and leading to rising discontent; crop losses led to unemployment that stoked Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Libya ; Brexit, even, was arguably a ripple effect of the influx of migrants brought to Europe by the wars that followed.

And all those effects were bound up with the movement of just two million people. As the mechanisms of climate migration have come into sharper focus — food scarcity, water scarcity and heat — the latent potential for large-scale movement comes to seem astronomically larger. In the nine countries stretching across the continent from Mauritania to Sudan, extraordinary population growth and steep environmental decline are on a collision course. Past droughts, most likely caused by climate change, have already killed more than , people there. And the region — with more than million people and growing — is threatened by rapid desertification, even more severe water shortages and deforestation.

Today researchers at the United Nations estimate that some 65 percent of farmable lands have already been degraded. The story is similar in South Asia, where nearly one-fourth of the global population lives. The World Bank projects that the region will soon have the highest prevalence of food insecurity in the world. While some 8. If it is not drought and crop failures that force large numbers of people to flee, it will be the rising seas.

We are now learning that climate scientists have been underestimating the future displacement from rising tides by a factor of three, with the likely toll being some million globally. Many coastal regions of the United States are also at risk. Through all the research, rough predictions have emerged about the scale of total global climate migration — they range from 50 million to million people displaced — but the global data is limited, and uncertainty remained about how to apply patterns of behavior to specific people in specific places.

Now, though, new research on both fronts has created an opportunity to improve the models tremendously. A few years ago, climate geographers from Columbia University and the City University of New York began working with the World Bank to build a next-generation tool to establish plausible migration scenarios for the future. The resulting report, published in early , involved six European and American institutions and took nearly two years to complete.

They determined that as climate change progressed in just these three regions alone, as many as million people would be displaced within their own borders, moving mostly from rural areas to nearby towns and cities. In early , The Times Magazine and ProPublica, with support from the Pulitzer Center, hired an author of the World Bank report — Bryan Jones, a geographer at Baruch College — to add layers of environmental data to its model, making it even more sensitive to climatic change and expanding its reach. Our goal was to pick up where the World Bank researchers left off, in order to model, for the first time, how people would move between countries, especially from Central America and Mexico toward the United States.

First we gathered existing data sets — on political stability, agricultural productivity, food stress, water availability, social connections, weather and much more — in order to approximate the kaleidoscopic complexity of human decision-making. Then we started asking questions: If crop yields continue to decline because of drought, for instance, and people are forced to respond by moving, as they have in the past, can we see where they will go and see what new conditions that might introduce? Instead of guessing what Jorge A. In all, we fed more than 10 billion data points into our model. Once the model was built and layered with both approaches — econometric and gravity — we looked at how people moved as global carbon concentrations increased in five different scenarios, which imagine various combinations of growth, trade and border control, among other factors.

These scenarios have become standard among climate scientists and economists in modeling different pathways of global socioeconomic development. Only a supercomputer could efficiently process the work in its entirety; estimating migration from Central America and Mexico in one case required uploading our query to a federal mainframe housed in a building the size of a small college campus outside Cheyenne, Wyo. A more detailed description of the data project can be found at propublica. The model also assumes that complex relationships — say, how drought and political stability relate to each other — remain consistent and linear over time when in reality we know the relationships will change, but not how.

Many people will also be trapped by their circumstances, too poor or vulnerable to move, and the models have a difficult time accounting for them. All this means that our model is far from definitive. But every one of the scenarios it produces points to a future in which climate change, currently a subtle disrupting influence, becomes a source of major disruption, increasingly driving the displacement of vast populations. Now she sells pupusas on a block not far from where teenagers stand guard for the Mara Salvatrucha gang. She relied on the kindness of her boss, who gave her some free meals at work. But everything else for her and her infant son she had to provide herself.

Cortez commuted before dawn from San Marcos, where she lived with her sister in a cheap room off a pedestrian alleyway. San Salvador, meanwhile, has become notorious as one of the most dangerous cities in the world, a capital in which gangs have long controlled everything from the majestic colonial streets of its downtown squares to the offices of the politicians who reside in them. Cortez was born about a mile from the Guatemalan border, in El Paste, a small town nestled on the side of a volcano. Her family were jornaleros — day laborers who farmed on the big maize and bean plantations in the area — and they rented a two-room mud-walled hut with a dirt floor, raising nine children there.

Then drought and unpredictable storms led to what a U. But the gangs found easy prey in vulnerable farmers and spread into the Salvadoran countryside and the outlying cities, where they made a living by extorting local shopkeepers. In other times, Cortez might have gone back home. But there was no work in El Paste, and no water. So she sent her children there and went to San Salvador instead. For all the ways in which human migration is hard to predict, one trend is clear: Around the world, as people run short of food and abandon farms, they gravitate toward cities, which quickly grow overcrowded. Food has to be imported — stretching reliance on already-struggling farms and increasing its cost. People will congregate in slums, with little water or electricity, where they are more vulnerable to flooding or other disasters.

The slums fuel extremism and chaos. It is a shift that is already well underway, which is why the World Bank has raised concerns about the mind-boggling influx of people into East African cities like Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, where the population has doubled since and is expected to nearly double again by In Mexico, the World Bank estimates, as many as 1. But like so much of the rest of the climate story, the urbanization trend is also just the beginning. In just a decade, four out of every 10 urban residents — two billion people around the world — will live in slums.

Some cities will be unable to sustain the influx.

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