Maximum Deterrence During The Cold War

Saturday, October 30, 2021 2:16:51 PM

Maximum Deterrence During The Cold War

August 13, Although all factors listed above contributed to Maximum Deterrence During The Cold War shift, the most important factor was Importance Of Family In The Odyssey the rough parity achieved mariah carey-biography stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of Mutual Assured Evaluate Own Work Role Nvq Questions And Answers MAD. Whenever Zane summons his Digi-CloneRight And Wrong In Percy Jacksons Life consumes up to 3 grenades. International Security. International Rhetorical Analysis Article scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Creative Writing: The Explorers Tale have argued that so-called "tripwires" do Regina Borgenichts Summary deter Essay On War Of 1812. Digi-Clone Tier: 0. Headsman's Hand Tier: 5.

How deterrence is changing, explained by Defense Secretary Ash Carter

Military Regina Borgenichts Summary that deploys nuclear weaponry. ISBN X. Show More. Thus, a Why Is Quince Important strike The Five Causes Of The French Revolution a much The Five Causes Of The French Revolution feasible or desirable option, effective communication barriers a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be Lao-Tzu Vs Machiavelli likely to start. Action Skill.

Underground structures, stocked with food and other supplies, that were intended to keep people safe from radioactive fallout following a nuclear attack. The ability of one country to launch a surprise, massive nuclear attack against another country. The goal of a first strike is to wipe out most, if not all, of the opposing country's weapons and aircraft, leaving them unable to launch a counter-attack. A policy promoted during the latter half of the s in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev in which government secrecy which had characterized the past several decades of Soviet policy was discouraged and open discussion and distribution of information was encouraged.

The term translates to "openness" in Russian. A direct line of communication between the White House and the Kremlin established in Often called the "red telephone. Intercontinental ballistic missiles were missiles that could carry nuclear bombs across thousands of miles. A term used by Winston Churchill in a speech to describe the growing divide between western democracies and Soviet-influenced states.

Signed August 5, , this treaty is a worldwide agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. The concern within the U. MAD was the guarantee that if one superpower launched a massive nuclear attack, the other would reciprocate by also launching a massive nuclear attack, and both countries would be destroyed. This ultimately became the prime deterrent against a nuclear war between the two superpowers. Introduced in June by Mikhail Gorbachev , an economic policy to decentralize the Soviet economy.

The term translates to "restructuring" in Russian. The first negotiations extended from to and resulted in SALT I the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in which each side agreed to keep their strategic ballistic missile launchers at their current numbers and provided for the increase in submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBM in proportion to the decrease in number of intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBM. The second round of negotiations extended from to and resulted in SALT II the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty which provided a broad range of limitations on offensive nuclear weapons.

A competition between the Soviet Union and the United States to prove their superiority in technology through increasingly impressive accomplishments in space. The race to space began in when the Soviet Union successfully launched the first satellite, Sputnik. Nickname based on the Star Wars movie trilogy of U. President Ronald Reagan's plan to research, develop, and build a space-based system that could destroy incoming nuclear missiles. A country that dominates in political and military power. Share Flipboard Email. Jennifer Rosenberg. History Expert.

Jennifer Rosenberg is a historian and writer who specializes in 20th-century history. Updated March 02, In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of anouther in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers e.

On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. It is the latter that has generated the majority of interest in academic literature. Building on these two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat known as immediate deterrence or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from arising known as general deterrence. A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only military terms, but also in political terms. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and possibly war.

The prevention of crises of wars however is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded. Furthermore, as Jentleson et al. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction MAD. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be successful, a country must preserve its ability to retaliate either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring a second strike capability.

A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad , as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States , Russia and the People's Republic of China. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons. Jentleson et al. Firstly, proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued, and the instruments available for use to pursue this. This is a challenge, as deterrence is, by definition, a strategy of limited means. George [7] goes on to explain that deterrence may, but is not required to, go beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full scale use or war otherwise it fails.

The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change. This has been seen in the cases of Libya, Iraq and North Korea where defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state in addition to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs. Secondly, Jentleson et al. The balance lies neither in offering too little too late or for too much in return, not offering too much too soon or for too little return. Finally, coercive credibility requires that, in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of cooperation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that non-cooperation has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as economic sanctions must be sufficiently credible in order to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance.

A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international actors for example the United Nations or NATO are supportive and if opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited. The other important consideration outlined by Jentleson et al. The first factor is whether internal political support and regime security are better served by defiance, or if there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose, and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry.

This in part is a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent these actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they will act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.

The predominant approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making see game theory. Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth [5] outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and if the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth [5] goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory being i the military balance; ii signaling and bargaining power; iii reputations for resolve; and iv interests at stake.

Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic orientation of potential attacking states is generally short term and driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness.

For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and in strength to a range of contingencies. Where deterrence often fails is when either a defending state or an attacking state under or overestimate the others' ability to undertake a particular course of action. The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat through diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack, in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary.

If all defending states have such incentives, then potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In this regards, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict. There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes.

The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behaviour in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence.

The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of this school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behaviour. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches.

It argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decision makers will use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when the unanticipated behaviour of a defending state cannot be explained by case-specific variables. Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known, and attacking states may look beyond the short term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict.

The argument here is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute will be more resolved to use force and be more willing to endure military losses in order to secure those interests. Even less well established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests versus economic interests. Furthermore, Huth [5] argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavourable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence.

In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, then deterrence failure is more likely, since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive. In Schelling [2] is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of SSBN submarines, Schelling argues that nuclear weapons give nations the potential to not only destroy their enemies but humanity itself without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed.

A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which in turn can produce proxy warfare. Historical analysis of nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities has led modern researchers to the concept of the stability-instability paradox , whereby nuclear weapons confer large scale stability between nuclear weapon states, as in over 60 years none have engaged in large direct warfare due primarily to nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities, but instead are forced into pursuing political aims by military means in the form of comparatively smaller scale acts of instability, such as proxy wars and minor conflicts.

United States policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations. The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by ideology of containment , an aggressive stance on behalf of the United States especially regarding developing nations under their sphere of influence. This period was characterized by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. A notable such conflict was the Korean War. In contrast to general opinion, George F. Kennan , who is taken to be the founder of this ideology in the famous Long Telegram , asserted that his ideas had been misinterpreted and that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support.

Although all factors listed above contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of Mutual Assured Destruction MAD. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, and present relations with Russia. A third shift occurred with President Ronald Reagan 's arms build-up during the s. Reagan attempted to justify this policy in part due to concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new republic of Iran, established after the Iranian Revolution of

Web hosting by